Security
Stop it. See it within a cycle. Halt it.
How the network prevents a wrong token, detects one and contains it. And what is not yet done.
Release candidate – Internal security review complete – Independent audit not yet complete
Prevent. Detect. Contain.
What an attacker would need.
The attack
Steals one signing key group at a bank
- What stops it
- Minting and burning need two separate key groups on the same instruction. One group alone is refused.
- What the supervisor sees
- The refusal, and the halt that follows
The attack
Forges a payment from another bank
- What stops it
- Both banks’ key groups sign every transfer between them.
- What the supervisor sees
- The rejected transfer
The attack
Creates settlement balance from nothing
- What stops it
- Only the central bank’s own signer can fund or reduce a settlement account.
- What the supervisor sees
- Every funding event
The attack
Corrupts one confirming computer
- What stops it
- Three of four must sign every block, and every receipt carries their signatures.
- What the supervisor sees
- Any divergence from its own copy
The attack
Issues tokens with no deposit behind them
- What stops it
- The proof fails at the next cycle and issuance halts.
- What the supervisor sees
- The failed proof
The attack
Restarts a halted token alone
- What stops it
- A restart takes more than one party: the bank’s own quorum and the operator, and the supervisor where the supervisor called the halt.
- What the supervisor sees
- The restart and who signed it
The attack
Leaves a cross-border payment half done
- What stops it
- Each side is locked with a time limit. Both complete, or both return.
- What the supervisor sees
- Each lock, release and return
The attack
Changes the rules quietly
- What stops it
- Rule packs are signed and versioned, and every decision cites its version. A stale version is refused.
- What the supervisor sees
- Every rule change
The attack
Takes over the supervisor’s key
- What stops it
- It can freeze. It cannot move value.
- What the supervisor sees
- Every freeze order
| The attack | What stops it | What the supervisor sees |
|---|---|---|
| Steals one signing key group at a bank | Minting and burning need two separate key groups on the same instruction. One group alone is refused. | The refusal, and the halt that follows |
| Forges a payment from another bank | Both banks’ key groups sign every transfer between them. | The rejected transfer |
| Creates settlement balance from nothing | Only the central bank’s own signer can fund or reduce a settlement account. | Every funding event |
| Corrupts one confirming computer | Three of four must sign every block, and every receipt carries their signatures. | Any divergence from its own copy |
| Issues tokens with no deposit behind them | The proof fails at the next cycle and issuance halts. | The failed proof |
| Restarts a halted token alone | A restart takes more than one party: the bank’s own quorum and the operator, and the supervisor where the supervisor called the halt. | The restart and who signed it |
| Leaves a cross-border payment half done | Each side is locked with a time limit. Both complete, or both return. | Each lock, release and return |
| Changes the rules quietly | Rule packs are signed and versioned, and every decision cites its version. A stale version is refused. | Every rule change |
| Takes over the supervisor’s key | It can freeze. It cannot move value. | Every freeze order |
As specified for FoC-P v1.0. Some of these controls are completed between the release candidate and the final release.
Your keys, your perimeter.
The gateway and the proof generator run inside your own perimeter. Your signing keys stay yours. Certification requires them in hardware security modules, under two separately administered groups.
Your customers' data.
No personal data is written to the shared ledger. Account references never leave your perimeter in the clear. The proof carries no customer data; this release discloses the token total and is not zero-knowledge. Where the travel rule applies, the required fields go from the paying institution to the receiving institution, encrypted for that institution alone.
Where the release stands.
Item
Conformance corpus
- Status
- 1,083 cases, passing
Item
Internal security review
- Status
- Completed November 2026. Findings are being fixed
Item
Independent audit
- Status
- Not yet begun. It starts on the second release candidate
Item
Formal verification
- Status
- Planned on the same release
Item
Hardware security module integration
- Status
- Specified. Not in the release candidate
Item
Penetration test of the operator’s services
- Status
- Not yet done
Item
Security certifications
- Status
- None held
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| Conformance corpus | 1,083 cases, passing |
| Internal security review | Completed November 2026. Findings are being fixed |
| Independent audit | Not yet begun. It starts on the second release candidate |
| Formal verification | Planned on the same release |
| Hardware security module integration | Specified. Not in the release candidate |
| Penetration test of the operator’s services | Not yet done |
| Security certifications | None held |
If something goes wrong.
Report a vulnerability.
Write to security@fiatonchain.com. We acknowledge within three working days. We welcome research done in good faith.
Send us your security questionnaire.
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