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Fiat-on-Chain

Security

Stop it. See it within a cycle. Halt it.

How the network prevents a wrong token, detects one and contains it. And what is not yet done.

Release candidate – Internal security review complete – Independent audit not yet complete

Prevent. Detect. Contain.

How FoC-P prevents, detects and contains a failurePrevent: two key groups must sign every mint and burn, rules are checked at the token, and three of four confirming computers must agree. Detect: tokens are proven equal to the bank's ledger every cycle, and the supervisor's node checks independently; no customer data is on the ledger or in the proof. Contain: a failed or missing proof halts issuance, no single party can restart it, and the source code is in escrow if the operator fails. 1PREVENT TWO KEY GROUPSBoth must sign every mint and burn RULES AT THE TOKENChecked before any value moves 3 OF 4 CONFIRMOne faulty computer cannot settle 2DETECT PROOF EVERY CYCLETokens must equal the bank's ledger SUPERVISOR NODEChecks again on its own computer EVERY EVENT ON RECORDRejections and halts reach the supervisor 3CONTAIN AUTOMATIC HALTA bad or missing proof stops issuance SIGNED RESTARTNo single party can restart OPERATOR FAILURESource in escrow, members step in Stop it. See it within a cycle. Halt it. Controls as specified for FoC-P v1.0. Independent audit not yet complete.

What an attacker would need.

  • The attack

    Steals one signing key group at a bank

    What stops it
    Minting and burning need two separate key groups on the same instruction. One group alone is refused.
    What the supervisor sees
    The refusal, and the halt that follows
  • The attack

    Forges a payment from another bank

    What stops it
    Both banks’ key groups sign every transfer between them.
    What the supervisor sees
    The rejected transfer
  • The attack

    Creates settlement balance from nothing

    What stops it
    Only the central bank’s own signer can fund or reduce a settlement account.
    What the supervisor sees
    Every funding event
  • The attack

    Corrupts one confirming computer

    What stops it
    Three of four must sign every block, and every receipt carries their signatures.
    What the supervisor sees
    Any divergence from its own copy
  • The attack

    Issues tokens with no deposit behind them

    What stops it
    The proof fails at the next cycle and issuance halts.
    What the supervisor sees
    The failed proof
  • The attack

    Restarts a halted token alone

    What stops it
    A restart takes more than one party: the bank’s own quorum and the operator, and the supervisor where the supervisor called the halt.
    What the supervisor sees
    The restart and who signed it
  • The attack

    Leaves a cross-border payment half done

    What stops it
    Each side is locked with a time limit. Both complete, or both return.
    What the supervisor sees
    Each lock, release and return
  • The attack

    Changes the rules quietly

    What stops it
    Rule packs are signed and versioned, and every decision cites its version. A stale version is refused.
    What the supervisor sees
    Every rule change
  • The attack

    Takes over the supervisor’s key

    What stops it
    It can freeze. It cannot move value.
    What the supervisor sees
    Every freeze order

As specified for FoC-P v1.0. Some of these controls are completed between the release candidate and the final release.

Your keys, your perimeter.

The gateway and the proof generator run inside your own perimeter. Your signing keys stay yours. Certification requires them in hardware security modules, under two separately administered groups.

Your customers' data.

No personal data is written to the shared ledger. Account references never leave your perimeter in the clear. The proof carries no customer data; this release discloses the token total and is not zero-knowledge. Where the travel rule applies, the required fields go from the paying institution to the receiving institution, encrypted for that institution alone.

Where the release stands.

  • Item

    Conformance corpus

    Status
    1,083 cases, passing
  • Item

    Internal security review

    Status
    Completed November 2026. Findings are being fixed
  • Item

    Independent audit

    Status
    Not yet begun. It starts on the second release candidate
  • Item

    Formal verification

    Status
    Planned on the same release
  • Item

    Hardware security module integration

    Status
    Specified. Not in the release candidate
  • Item

    Penetration test of the operator’s services

    Status
    Not yet done
  • Item

    Security certifications

    Status
    None held

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